Pricing Policies in Government Contracts by Nash, Ralph C., Jr.
PRICING POLICIES IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
RALPH C. NASH, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The federal government is the largest purchaser of goods and services in the
nation.' In this capacity, the government buys all types of items from pencils to
spacecraft. However, the bulk of the money spent by the government is for
custom-made goods or specialized services which are furnished to meet specific
requirements of the various agencies. In this type purchasing, the pricing of goods
and services cannot be arrived at by normal techniques in a market where sellers
manufacture goods for anticipated demand. There the seller establishes the price
based on competitive conditions and the buyer buys at his option. However, there
is little bargaining over price. In the pricing of custom-made goods, on the other
hand, the buyer becomes much more intimately involved in the determination of
price. It is this position in which the federal government has found itself to a greater
and greater extent in the past few years.2 As this has occurred, the government has
discussed and promulgated a substantial amount of policy governing the participa-
tion of government procurement personnel in the pricing of the goods and services
it buys. The purpose of this article is to analyze the techniques that are being used,
the changes that have been made in this area in the past few years, and some of the
possible results of the current pricing policies.
In the past three years the Department of Defense, by far the largest purchaser
in the government, has undertaken a major program of reviewing its pricing tech-
niques and of revising them to accomplish new purposes. As a result of this effort,
the Department of Defense has issued several important changes of policy and
numerous statements clarifying its intent in changing the policy. This information
contains the clearest statement of what the problems of the government are in this
area and what current actions are being taken to solve these problems. This article
will therefore deal primarily with these Department of Defense policies, since they
represent the most significant effort to resolve the problems in pricing. It should
be understood, however, that the other government agencies with major procurement
*A.B. 1953, Princeton University; J.D. 1957, George Washington University. Associate Professor and
Director of the Government Contracts Program, George Washington University.
' Government procurement totals approximately $35 billion annually at the present time. This figure
is difficult to identify precisely but it is in this range. The major component of this total is the Depart-
ment of Defense, where the total procurement figure was $27.8 billion in fiscal year 1962, Subcommittee
on Defense Procurement of the Joint Economic Committee, Background Material on Economic Aspects
of Military Procurement and Supply, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963). Non-defense purchases bring the
figure up to the $35 billion range.
'For an interesting analysis of the portion of government procurement dealing with major systems, see
M. J. PEcK & F. M. SCHERER, THE ,VEAPONs AcQuISTON PROCESS CC. 2 through 7 (x962).
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programs face the same problems and in many cases are using similar techniques to
solve their problems.
I
THE USE OF COMPETITION
In a situation where prices are established by sellers unilaterally, the role of com-
petition is to offer buyers reasonable alternatives to a seller's product and hence to
assure reasonable prices. This type of competition operates in only a small portion
of government procurement. However, there is still a major effort to utilize com-
petition in establishing prices in government procurement. The technique used is to
solicit competitive bids or proposals to a specification furnished by the government
and to select the best bid or proposal for the award of the contract. If the specifica-
tions can be made so definitive that all aspects of the work are clearly spelled out,
advertised procurement techniques are used and the award is made with price as the
major deciding factor.3 On the other hand, if there are other aspects of the work
which must be evaluated and the specifications cannot be made completely firm,
competitive negotiation is undertaken with the government making its judgment
on the basis of all material factors and reserving the right to negotiate further with
the contractors after the proposals are received.4 In either case, there is the under-
lying presumption that the use of competition is the most effective pricing technique
since it will prevent contractors from inflating their prices to include an amount of
profit which is unreasonable.
Thus, competition can be looked at as the preferred technique for contract pricing
-the technique which is most like the operation of the commercial market technique
where all prices are established with a knowledge of market conditions. The
difficulty in this type of competition lies in the need for specifications to define the
government requirement. If the specifications are not relatively precise, the con-
'The procurement statutes specify advertised procurement as the preferred method of procurement.
Xo U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1948), as amended by Pub. L. 87-653, Sept. io, x962, 41 U.S.C. § 252(C) (1949).
It should be noted that the 1962 amendment to 1o U.S.C. § 2304(a) was intended to express the con-
gressional policy favoring advertised procurement in more specific terms. The new language states: "Pur.
chases of and contracts for property or services covered by this chapter shall be made by formal advertising
in all cases in which the use of such method is feasible and practicable under the existing conditions and
circumstances. If use of such method is not feasible and practicable, the head of an agency, subject to
the requirements for determinations and findings in section 2310, may negotiate such a purchase or contract,
if ... ." The Department of Defense (DOD) has identified four prerequisites for using the formal
advertised method. These are: (i) a complete, adequate, and realistic specification, (2) two or more
suppliers available, willing and able to compete effectively, (3) circumstances permitting the selection of the
successful bidder to be made on the basis of price alone, and (4) sufficient time to carry out the admin-
istrative procedures necessary for formal advertising. Hearings Before the Procurement Subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on Armed Services [hereinafter cited as Procurement Study], 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. i, at 67 (196o).
'The fact that competition can and does occur in negotiated procurements has been difficult to get
across to Congress. However, in fiscal year x96x Department of Defense statistics indicate that 32.9% of
all procurement was based on price competition (including approximately 13% comprising formal adver-
tising). In fiscal year 1962 this was raised to 35.6%. The DOD goal is 40% of procurement using price
competition. See Morris, Better Performance and Control of Costs in Defense Contracting, GovwEMENta
CoNmAcrs Aim PRocuRsE rNT (Commerce Clearing House, 1963).
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tractors will not be able to estimate their costs accurately with the result that the
prices submitted may be far from accurate. In such cases, the primary benefits of
competition in contract pricing are not fulfilled since the lack of accuracy in the
estimates may result in prices which are either loaded with contingencies or too low.
In either case the parties to the contract have agreed to a price that will create
difficulties during performance.
The critical problem, then, is to obtain good specifications on which competitive
procurement can be based. In some cases the government is capable of preparing
such specifications with its own personnel, but in the majority of cases, this job of
preparing specifications falls upon contractors and requires a large amount of pre-
liminary research and engineering before the actual writing of the specifications can
be undertaken.; Hence, a major portion of the procurement effort of the Depart-
ment of Defense is aimed at procuring the preparation of the specifications for needed
products and the problem becomes one of the best pricing technique for buying
these development contract services. Here too competition is one answer to the
problem but it must be realized that such competition is related to factors such as
technical competence, managerial ability and background in a particular field more
than price. Thus, the further removed the program is from manufacture of a
product, normally the less of a factor is price competition.
An additional difficulty arises when the specification preparation is done by a con-
tractor. In such cases, the development contractor usually is in a preferred position
when the initial manufacturing work is required.6 This preferred position is
a result of the fact that the specifications are written with the contractor's manu-
facturing facilities in mind, he has already obtained special tooling to produce
prototypes, the specifications contain requirements which can only be met using
information that is proprietary to the contractor or the lead time is so short
that no other contractor can assimilate the information in the specifications in
time to meet the delivery schedule. Usually in complex products, all or most
of these factors are present. Thus, when the Government has finally reached
the position where it has the necessary specifications to obtain competition, it
finds that many other factors prevent the use of competition. Hence, one of the
major areas of consideration in developing new procurement techniques is this need
to prevent the development contractor from establishing this type of preferred
position in all future manufacturing of the product,
Several steps have been taken in this direction in recent years. A major effort has
been made to "break out" parts of a product for competitive procurement even
' The government uses three general types of contract specifications: (i) detail specifications, (2) per-
formance specifications and (3) purchase descriptions. See Procurement Study, supra note 3, at 73-75;
ASPR sec. x, part 12. When using the latter two types, however, the government has merely transferred
the specification problem to the contractor-he must create a detail specification before the product can
be manufactured. Often such procurements are made when several contractors already have such specifica-
tions available-when several products will meet the government's requirements and the contract specifica-
tion is used merely to state that requirement in a general way.
' See ASPR 3-1o8, 32 C.F.R. § 3.108 (1963).
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though the entire product would not be subject to competitive procurement.y
Hence, spare parts might be broken out or a component of a system might be
susceptive to "break out." Occasionally an entire product can be established for
competitive procurement in the third or fourth year of manufacturing.' By this
time the specifications may have become quite firm and there may be sufficient lead
time to enable a second contractor to do the necessary preliminary engineering and
tooling. In such cases, the government has some additional protection since it can
always fall back on the first contractor if the second source fails. This type of effort
usually seems to have the beneficial effect of forcing the first contractor to review
his costs and reduce his prices so that the cost reduction benefits of competition are
often carried through the balance of the manufacturing effort by such a technique.
Another effort that has been undertaken in the past five years is to prevent develop-
ment contractors from including components which are subject to proprietary rights
in their designs.9 This is accomplished by requirements that such components be
approved by the contracting officer prior to incorporation in the design or require-
ments that all such proprietary data be turned over to the government as part of the
development contract. All of these policies are aimed at obtaining more competition.
All of these actions indicate that the Department of Defense is committed to
the proposition that competition is the best method for establishing fair prices.
To a large extent this view is a product of the idea, long held by the General Account-
ing Office and Congress, that government personnel cannot establish fair prices by
cost analysis and hence must rely on competition. This extreme reliance on competi-
tion as a pricing mechanism is highlighted by the recent change to the regulations
which incorporated a provision stating that government personnel should make no
effort to reduce prices of the low proposer in negotiated procurements when
adequate price competition has been obtained.10 Thus, the concept that competition
is the best pricing technique seems firmly entrenched in government procurement.
'See the testimony of Secretary of Defense McNamara on March 28, 1963 before the Subcommittee
on Defense Procurement of the joint Economic Committee, 88th Cong., ist Sess. (x963) reprinted in
Background Material on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and Supply, supra note x, at 69. In
this testimony Mr. McNamara indicated that the initial effort in this new procedure was in the acro-
nautical spare parts where competition was increased 78% in fiscal year 1962. See also DOD Policy Paper
set forth in Air Force Procurement Circular No. go, Nov. 6, 1963, 6 Gov'T CONT. REP. 80,135 (963).
s Secretary McNamara's first annual progress report on the DOD Cost Reduction Program [hereinafter
cited as Cosr R aucrIoN REsoRT] indicates that 58 major procurements were made competitively (in lieu
of the previous sole source method) during the third quarter of fiscal year x963. He further indicates
that this is a major aspect of the Cost Reduction Program. This report is Appendix 2 to the Report of
the Subcommittee on Defense Procurement to the Joint Economic Committee, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(July 1963).
'A related effort is assuring that contractors promptly submit all data called for by development
contracts. (Until the data is submitted, the procuring agency is clearly unable to obtain competition.)
For this purpose, a clause providing for withholding of io% of the contract price until satisfactory data
was delivered was added to the ASPR in April 1962. See ASPR 9-207.2, 32 C.F.R. § 9.207-2 (1962).
" ASPR 3-808.1(c), 32 C.F.R. § 3.808.1(c) (z963). See also the DOD Policy Paper, supra note 7,
stating that the reason for lower prices in competitive procurements is that they demand and get "a
degree of industrial efficiency, economy and elimination of frills that normally cannot be imposed in the
negotiation of noncompetitive contracts."
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II
NONCOMPETITIVE PRICING TECHNIQUES
When price competition cannot be obtained, the government normally falls back
on cost and profit analysis and negotiation to determine a fair price.P1 This tech-
nique involved a detailed analysis of the estimated cost of performance of a job, the
negotiation of this estimated cost, and the addition to such cost of a profit which the
parties believe to be a fair reward for the work under contract. Hence, the determina-
tion of the price is handled as a two step procedure with the major emphasis placed
on cost negotiation. In addition, since the government is usually unsure of its
ability to accurately estimate the cost, the normal rule is to use a type of contract
which delays the final establishment of the price to be paid until all of the costs have
been incurred. In such cases, the costs paid are the "actual" costs of performance
(excluding disallowed costs) 2 and the profit paid is usually based on a predetermined
arrangement established early in the performance of the work. The most frequently
used types of contracts of this nature are the cost-plus-fixed-fee, cost-plus-incentive-fee,
and fixed-price-incentive contract' 3
This method of pricing contracts after the work has been completed is used by the
government primarily to reduce the risk that the initial cost estimate is too high and
thus that the government will pay too much profit. However, the immediate impact
of the technique is to greatly reduce the incentive to the contractor to utilize resources
efficiently in the performance of the job. Since costs will be reimbursed, the con-
tractor need not treat costs in the same manner he would under a firm fixed price
contract-where each expenditure of costs is looked at as an expenditure out of
profit. Thus, the government is faced with a dilemma-if it could estimate costs
accurately, it would use a firm fixed price contract and provide maximum incentive
for the efficient use of resources, but since cost estimates are suspect, the government
wants to reimburse only actual costs which destroys the incentive to reduce costs.
In an attempt to arrive at the best solution to this dilemma, the Department of
Defense embarked on a program in March 1962, aimed at reducing the use of
cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts. At the time this program was undertaken,
" ASPR 3-807.2, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807.2 (1963) states: "Some form of price or cost analysis should be
made in connection with every negotiated procurement action. The presence of adequate price competition,
however, limits considerably the degree of analysis required. Cost data should not be requested when the
contracting officer anticipates that there will be adequate price competition. However, if he determines,
after proposals have been submitted, that there is not, in fact, adequate price competition, cost data may
then be requested unless there are other bases (e.g., pricing data) available for evaluating the reasonable-
ness of the quoted price." The DOD Policy Paper, supra note 7, contains more detailed guidance on the
proper use of cost analysis.
as The elaborate principles for determining "allowable" costs are set forth in section x5 of the ASPR
and FPR.
" The major distinction between these types of contract is in the arrangement for determining the
profit to be paid (they all reimburse allowable costs of actual performance with the exception of the
fixed price incentive contract in the rare cases when the ceiling price prevents recovery of full costs).
In the cost plus fixed fee contract, as the name implies, the fee to be paid is fixed at the beginning of the
work. In the incentive types of contract the profit or fee varies inversely with the cost in accordance
with a formula stated in the contract. See section 3, part 4, of ASPR and FPR.
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almost forty per cent of Department of Defense funds were being utilized on CPFF
contracts and there was a general feeling that a sizable portion of this money was
being spent inefficiently.14 Hence, the Armed Services Procurement Regulation was
rewritten to require that incentive and fixed price contracts be used more frequently
with quite stringent restrictions on the use of the CPFF type contract."5 In addition,
the Department of Defense established goals for each service limiting the use of
CPFF contracts to a specified percentage of their total funds."0 The result of this
program has been a marked reduction in the use of CPFF contracts with a com-
mensurate rise in th use of firm fixed-price, fixed-price-incentive and cost-plus-
incentive-fee contracts.
The use of incentive contracts in lieu of CPFF contracts theoretically should
have two effects on contract prices. First, by itself the use of incentive contracts
should increase the original cost estimates of contractors.11 This is almost inevitable
since there is a much greater risk (of losing profits) on the incentive contract and
therefore a much greater need for careful and realistic preparation of cost estimates.
Stated another way, the incentive contract places a greater penalty on the contractor
who "buys in" on a procurement by intentionally submitting a low estimate. Hence,
the first result of this trend away from CPFF contracts should be higher estimated
prices. Second, the use of incentive contracts will presumably result in reduced
costs of performance of the work. The essence of this type of contract is a simple
proposition by the government to the contractor-if you will reduce your costs
we will pay you higher profits. Conversely, of course, the contractor that does not
reduce his performance costs will be penalized by reduced profits. This inverse
relationship between costs and profit is basic to the incentive contract."'
The most frequent criticism of this policy of using incentive contracts is the
one that has been made by General Accounting Office and congressional com-
mentators for a number of years-if the original target is too high, the incentive
"This program is explained in Cosr RaDucrmoN REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 43. This report
states that in the first nine months of fiscal year 1961 38.0% of DOD procurement funds were awarded
on cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts whereas the percentage had declined to 21.1% in the first ten months of
fiscal year r963. For a more complete explanation of incentive contracting see RALPH C. NAsH, Ja., IN-
CENTIvE CoNTRAcTiNo (Government Contracts Monograph No. 7, George Washington University, z963).
"Revision 8 of the 596o edition of ASPR (March 15, x962) containing a complete revision of section
3, part 4-
"The overall goals for maximum use of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts are: Fiscal year 1963, 25.8%;
Fiscal year 1964, ig.i%; Fiscal year 1965, 12.3%. Cosr REDUcnON REPORT, op. cit. stpra note 8.
"' One of the original reasons for increasing the use of incentive contracts was to force contractors to
submit better cost and delivery estimates when original proposals were being submitted on new programs.
More accurate estimates were vital to the Department of Defense because the information submitted by
contractors was being used to make management decisions within the Department.
"' The Department of Defense has taken two other steps that aim at this same goal of encouraging
more efficient performance. One is the creation of a contractor performance rating system which will
numerically rate all contractors performing major development contracts. These ratings will be used
in future source selection decisions and in establishing profit rates on future contracts. See Department
of Defense Directive No. 5126.38 (Aug. 1, 1963). A second step is the inclusion of past performance
as a factor in the new profit formula. This will give contractors with good past performance a higher
rate of profit on new contracts than that given contractors with poor past performance. See ASPR
3-8o8.5(d), 32 C.F.R. 3.8o8-5(d) (1963).
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profits paid may be primarily a result of this high estimate rather than cost reduction
during performance of the work.'9 This result of "unearned" profit is not as
great on an incentive contract as it is on a firm fixed price contract because the
contractor gets only a share of the reduced costs on the incentive contract whereas
he gets the entire reduction on the fixed price contract. But the result does occur.
It is a product of the fact that to create incentive, the government must take a risk-
the risk of high original cost estimates. On the other hand, if the target cost is
too low, the contractor will be penalized under the incentive contract. Hence, the
need for better techniques for estimating costs is .critical to the entire incentive
contracting policy.
Why do cost estimates tend to be relatively inaccurate in some cases? One
major reason is the fact that often the specifications for the work are not definitive.
A second reason is that frequently the work has never been done before with the
result that there is no prior cost experience available. Finally, there is the fact that
cost estimates are by their very nature only accurate within certain limits since they
are based on forecasts of future events. In some cases little can be done to overcome
these difficulties but there are many instances where better procurement planning
and management will help to minimize these causes for inaccuracy. One effort
toward this end is under way in the Department of Defense at this time. This
is the Project Definition Phase of major research and development programs. 20
This effort is being inserted between the research phase and the development phase
of such programs. It is a short (four to six months) effort to define the specifica-
tions, evaluate the critical aspects of the job, and improve the cost estimates for the
development phase of the work which is to follow. In effect, it is a forced period of
planning inserted into the program prior to the commencement of development work
where large expenditures of funds will occur. Hence, it is specifically directed
toward the problem of obtaining better target cost estimates in incentive contracts.
One other step which the Department of Defense has taken to improve its
pricing practices in the area of costs is to increase the audit surveillance of con-
tractors' proposals and the audit assistance furnished to contracting officers during
negotiation of costs.21 In addition, the cost estimating personnel in the government
"o See the testimony of the Comptroller General during Hearings Before the Procurement Subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. i46 (196o), and Hearings Before the
Special Subcommittee on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense of the House Armed
Services Committee, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 404 (196o). This attitude on the part of Congress is expressed
in H.R. REP. No. 1959, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-33 (ig6o). Although there is a valid point to this
type of criticism, it should not be overlooked that even if the incentive targets are inflated, the contract
still gives incentive for cost reduction and thus still provides the motivation for efficient use of resources.
" See Rubel, R & D Contracts: Policies and Problems, in REsLU~cS AND DEVELOPMENT CONTRACrING,
25 (George Washington University, z963).
" Talk by Frank S. Howell, Ass't Auditor General of the Air Force, at the Federal Bar Association
Conference on the Fiscal Aspects of Government Contracts, December 5-6, i963. Mr. Howell commented
that the general concept that a Government auditor deals only with incurred costs is much too narrow.
He pointed out that a substantial amount of the effort of the audit services of DOD at the present time
is being spent in reviewing contractor's estimates of future costs (for pricing purposes) and that this was
a proper function of the auditor.
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appear to be improving in their capabilities. However, with all of the improvements
that have been made, it is clear that much can still be done to increase the ability
of the government to evaluate and negotiate cost estimates of contractors on work
which is being done for the first time. For instance, there is a great need for im-
proved statistical pricing data in many of the product areas where the government
buys (data similar to the learning curve data developed in the airplane industry).
This is not a hopeless task but there is no doubt that much improvement is needed
within the government before there can be an assurance that incentive contract
targets are established with reasonable accuracy.
Another aspect of the determination of estimated costs is the problem of dis-
allowed costs. It has been the policy of the government to disallow certain costs
under cost reimbursement contracts in order to achieve uniformity of treatment of
such costs by removing the need for individual consideration of their merits on a
case-by-case basis. Such disallowed costs include entertainment, donations, certain
advertising and recruitment expenses, interest and financing costs, as well as many
other costs. 2 These same criteria for the allowability of a cost are also being
applied during the negotiation of estimated costs of fixed price or incentive con-
tracts2 3 and there appears to be a trend in the direction of increasing such dis-
allowances. To the extent that such costs can be avoided during contract perform-
ance, this is a technique for encouraging the contractor not to incur the costs.
However, to the extent these costs are necessary business costs, nonallowance of these
costs is merely a profit reduction deviceY4 Hence, every contractor must discount
the negotiated profit on a contract by some amount to reflect these unallowable
costs. If the number of disallowed costs are increasing, this will become an in-
creasingly serious problem in terms of negotiating contract prices.
A further difficulty that is present in the costing area is the treatment of so-called
"contingencies." These are the costs which cannot be positively identified as a cost
of performance yet may occur with varying degrees of probability. To a large extent
they are a product of the view of the parties to the work-the government normally
taking a relatively optimistic view and the contractor being somewhat more pessi-
mistic. In a contract for work where there is no previous cost experience, of course,
the "contingencies" can be expected to be sizable. Hence, the amount of con.
tingencies included in the estimated or target cost will be of great importance in
determining the accuracy of the estimate. The regulations provide for the in-
clusion of contingencies in estimates of cost if they "arise from presently known
" Section 15, part 2 of ASPR and FPR. The Bureau of the Budget will issue government-wide
cost principles for industrial contractors in the near future.
"ASPR x5-603(a), 32 C.F.R. § 15.603(a) (x963) provides that when costs are being considered in'
the negotiation of fixed-price type contracts the cost principles "shall be used as a guide" in evaluating cost
data.
"Mr. Graeme Bannerman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Procurement) has stated that many
companies figure that such disallowances run from 2 to 4% of total costs. Hearings on Systems Develop.
ment and Management Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 553 (x962).
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and existing conditions, the effects of which are foreseeable within reasonable limits
of accuracy." 25 Thus, some contingencies can be included although the types allowed
are difficult to define. In addition, in discussing firm fixed-price contracts the
regulations state that such contracts can be used when the uncertainties in contract
performance can be identified and their costs estimated with reasonable accuracy
and "the contractor is willing to accept a firm fixed price at a level which represents
assumption of a reasonable proportion of the risks involved."26  This statement
implies that the government will also assume a reasonable proportion of the risks
(contingencies) by including them in the contract price. Hence, this too is a state-
ment that some contingencies may be included in cost estimates. However, in
practice contracting officers are reluctant to include many contingencies in cost
targets with the result that often these targets are closely priced.
Thus, the need to include more incentives for efficient use of resources in con-
tracts has created a need for better cost estimating techniques to establish valid target
costs in such contracts. Some efforts have been made by the government in this
direction but much remains to be accomplished. The natural alternative in this
situation, and the one that has been utilized by the Department of Defense, is to
attempt to bring competition into play in establishing target costs on such contracts.
This attempt is obviously difficult since the procurements in question are, by
definition, those which cannot be made on the basis of price competition alone. In
most cases they are procurements for development work or for manufacturing of
major weapons systems where it would not be practical to bring in another con-
tractor. In the latter case there is no method of obtaining competition once the
weapons system is designed, 7 but in the case of development work it is the practice
of the Department of Defense to obtain competition2 s This competition, of course,
is based on many factors in addition to price-factors such as past experience, tech-
nical ability, and management ability. However, the price aspect is considered and
may play an important role in the selection of the contractor. In any event, the
fact that there is competition, with one of the factors being price, results in con-
tractors being very careful in evaluating their cost estimates and thus serves the
purpose of achieving reasonable target costs. The danger in such a practice is that
it will result in target costs that are too low-that in major development programs
'
5 ASPR 15-205.7(c), 32 C.F.R. § I5.205-7(c) (x963).
0 ASPR 3-404.2(b), 32 C.F.R. § 3. 4 04-2(b) (x963). (Emphasis added.)
2 A technique for utilizing competition to establish prices in this area is to tie the manufacturing
to the design and obtain competition on the entire package. This can be done on smaller systems and
components and it is being attempted on a few major systems through the use of fixed price options for
manufacturing which are included in the development contract. See NAsH, op. cit. supra note 14, at
101-04.
" ASPR 3-403(c) discusses the techniques for buying development. It tells the contracting officer to
make Government objectives known to all contractors and to request proposals including firm targets
from contractors. It then continues, "performance and schedule completion targets proposed by each
prospective contractor in meeting the Government's desired objectives, together with the estimated cost
thereof, should be considered by the Government in the competitive contractor selection process." (Em-
phasis added.) This clearly contemplates the use of competition in development procurements.
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whose costs are not subject to accurate estimation, the extreme competitive pressure
may induce contractors to underestimate their costs in an attempt to win the award.
This is dearly a real possibility under a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract where the
costs incurred by the contractor will be reimbursed in any event (subject to a re-
duction in profit for cost overruns). Thus, while competition can be used as a
pricing device to a limited degree when prices are being established by cost evalua-
tion, it should be recognized that such a practice may also cast some doubts on
the validity of the cost estimate.
Turning to the determination of profits in the noncompetitive pricing situation,
the tendency in government contracting in the past few years has been for profit
levels to become quite uniform depending on the type of contract being used.
Hence, profit rates on cost reimbursement contracts were "negotiated" at five to
seven per cent of estimated cost, rates on fixed-price incentive contracts fell between
eight and one half and ten per cent, and rates on firm fixed-price contracts were
normally set from ten to twelve per cent2 There was little perceptible correlation
between profit rates and past performance by the contractor or difficulty of the work
being placed under contract. Neither was there much relationship between profit
rates and the investment which the contractor was making in the job. For these
reasons, the Department of Defense felt that new, more precise profit guidelines were
necessary to make the profit component of government contract prices better serve
the purpose of encouraging better performance by contractors and penalizing poor
performance.
In addition, the earned profit rates on defense contracts appear to have continually
decreased in the past few years3 As this decrease has occurred, government officials
29 See STUDY OF PRoFrr OR FEE POLICY, submitted to the Department of Defense by Logistics Manage-
ment Institute, at 47-48 (1962). This study was the basis for the new DOD weighted guideline profit
policy. The study found that there was great reliance by negotiating personnel in the Department of
Defense on historical profit levels.
so The Annual Reports to Congress submitted by the Renegotiation Board give total profits earned
on renegotiable and non-renegotiable business reported by companies subject to renegotiation. These
figures reflect the profits on business reported during the fiscal year before renegotiation has taken place.
The trend is as follows:
Fiscal Year Renegotiable Profits Non-renegotiable Profits
1956 6.36% 9.1%
1957 5.72% 10.1%
i958 4.83% 9.7%
1959 4.21% 7.9%
196o 4.01% 9.0%
x96i 3.62% 7.8%
1962 3.13% information not available in
x963 2.94% Renegotiation Board Reports
It should be noted that the trend indicated by these figures reflects the impact of all variables affecting the
renegotiation process (one of which probably is the ability of the government in negotiating or setting the
price). Two other variables which may have had a significant effect on the statistics are (a) the changed
provisions governing the inclusion of standard commercial articles, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1216(e) (1958); and
(b) the new depreciation provisions included in the Revenue Act of 1962, INT. REv. CoDE ov 1954, § 46,
76 Stat. 962 (1962), and REVENUE PROCEDURE 62-21 (July, 1962). The standard commercial article pro-
vision seemingly removed a substantial amount of sales from the renegotiation figures starting in 1958 ($
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have been forced to ask whether the profit rates on defense contracting were be-
coming so low that they would reach the point where they would no longer attract
the best resources (personnel and plant equipment) to defense procurement. There
are analytical problems involved in answering this question because the available
profit statistics are renegotiation figures which reflect different cost bases than those
established in defense contracts. Hence, the renegotiation cost bases are thought to
contain from one to four per cent more costs than Department of Defense
costs.8 ' In addition, no collateral information has appeared at this time to verify
the fact that defense contracting profit rates are discouraging the use of resources.
Actually, the available information seems to indicate the reverse-there appears
to be more competition for government contracts now than ever before. However,
the need for higher profits on defense work is evidently a component of the new
Department of Defense profit regulations.
What, then, do these new Department of Defense profit regulations provide?
Essentially, they separate negotiated profit into two major and three minor com-
ponents.82  Each of these components is to be analyzed and negotiated separately
with the total profit for each contract being the sum of the five. The two major
components are the input of the contractor in terms of the amount and quality of
effort which the contractor himself will put into the job and the assumption of
cost responsibility of the contractor. In the first area of contractor input the new
guidelines give high profit rates for engineering and management labor, middle
rates for manufacturing labor and indirect costs, and low profit rates for sub-
contracted effort. In each case there is a range of profit with some judgment being
required by the person negotiating the contract. In the cost responsibility area, the
use of a firm fixed-price contract provides a high rate of profit, the incentive types of
contract yield median rates of profit, and the CPFF contract provides almost no
profit component in this area. The other factor to be considered in this area is
the accuracy and closeness of the contractor's cost estimate-here too a degree
of judgment will be required. The three minor components all have a relatively
small effect on profit. They are the past performance of the contractor, a factor in-
cluding the source of the resources used by the contractor plus any special achieve-
ment required by the contract and a special profit bonus if the item being procured
was developed by the contractor at his own expense. The range of these factors is
approximately as follows:
to $2 billion per year); and on the assumption that this type sales is generally more profitable than the
average, may have considerable influence in the noticeable reduction of profit rates from 1957 to 1958.
The more liberal depreciation rules have undoubtedly increased the costs of contractors and may therefore
have had some effect in the profit reduction from 1962 to 1963. However, it is very questionable whether
this impact is as great as it will be in later years.
8 1 See note 24 supra.
"' The new regulations are set forth in ASPR 3-808, 32 C.F.R. § 3.808 (x963). They are quite
complex and require detailed analysis to derive a full understanding of their impact. The analysis in the
text is therefore a broad summary that does not attempt to depict the specific workings of this profit
policy.
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Minimum Maximum
Contractor Input 4% 9%
Assumption of Cost Responsibility 0 7%
Past Performance -2% 2%
Resources and Special Achievement -:2% 2%
Independent Development o% 4%
Total ............................ o% 24%
The result of these new profit guidelines can be forecast to be profit rates in the
range of eight to twelve per cent for development contracts using incentive contracts
and of ten to fifteen per cent for manufacturing contracts of a firm fixed price basis.
These ranges would appear to indicate increased profits for contractors. However,
using contract types with less risk in the same situation changes the profit ranges
substantially. Hence, development contracts on a CPFF basis will probably yield
profit rates in the range of six to nine per cent and manufacturing contracts on an
incentive basis will yield profits in the range of six to ten per cent.
The crucial problem that can be foreseen in the application of these profit guide-
lines is whether they will be applied without regard to the bargaining power of the
parties. For instance, if the contractor feels the guidelines do not yield a sufficiently
high rate of profit to justify taking the work, will the government be willing to pay
more than the guidelines provide? Conversely, if the government negotiator has
been purchasing from a contractor at certain profit levels, will he be willing to pay
substantially higher profit rates as dictated by the new guidelines even though he
knows that the contractor would perform the work for the previously acceptable profit
rate? The intent of the Department of Defense appears to be to allow profit rates
to increase if so dictated by the new profit guidelines. For instance, the new regula-
tions contain the following language:
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to utilize profit to stimulate efficient contract
performance. Profit generally is the basic motive of business enterprise. The government
and defense contractors should be concerned with harnessing this motive to work for more
effective and economical contract performance. Negotiation of very low profits, the use
of historical averages, or the automatic application of a predetermined percentage to the
total estimated cost of a product, does not provide the motivation to accomplish such
performance. Furthermore, low average profit rates on defense contracts overall are
detrimental to the public interest. Effective national defense in a free enterprise economy
requires that the best industrial capabilities be attracted to defense contracts. These
capabilities will be driven away from the defense market if defense contracts are char-
acterized by low profit opportunities. Consequently, negotiations aimed merely at re-
ducing costs by reducing profits, with no realization of the function of profit cannot
be condoned. For each contract in which profit is negotiated as a separate element of the
contract price, the aim of negotiation should be to employ the profit motive so as to impel
.effective contract performance by which overall contract costs are economically controlled.
To this end, the profit objective must be fitted to the circumstances of the particular
procurement, giving due weight to each of the performance, risk, and other factors set
PRICING POLICIES IN GovERN NT CONTRAcTs 373
forth in . . . [this regulation 3-808]. This will result in a wider range of profits which,
in many cases, will be significantly higher than previous norms.
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Another recent Department of Defense policy statement throws additional light
on this problem. In a memorandum to the military services, the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Installations and Logistics directed that cost sharing not be used as a
cost reduction device, i.e., that cost-sharing contracts not be negotiated in cases
where the government's superior bargaining position enabled it to force such a
contract on a contractor. 4  In this memorandum it is pointed out that the cost-
sharing type contract was intended for use when a contractor would derive some
substantial benefit from the contract that would compensate for the cost it provided.
The memorandum pointed out further that the use of cost-sharing contracts in other
situations would encourage underbidding and enable large contractors with financial
resources to force smaller contractors out of the competition for such work. Hence,
this is a case where the Department of Defense has specifically directed its procure-
ment personnel not to allow contractors to reduce their profits as a bargaining
device.
These recent directions from the Department of Defense indicate a major effort
to change the concept of profit in the Department. This effort is directed at two
objectives-the use of profit as a motivation for better performance, and the establish-
ment of profit rates at levels which are fairer to contractors. It should be noted,
however, that these policies only apply to the procurements which are subject to cost
analysis and negotiation. They do not apply to price-competition type procure-
ments. Hence, in one sense they are aimed at increasing profits in the noncompeti-
tive part of defense procurement.3 5 It is difficult to determine whether this policy is
" ASPR 3-808.1(a), 32 C.F.R. § 3.8o8-1(a) (1963). See also DOD Policy Paper, supra note 7. The
difficulty from the point of view of the Government negotiator is that he is trained to expect some benefit
for the Government in return for higher profits and the benefits that can be achieved from generally higher
profits are quite remote. Hence, such benefits as increased financial ability of the contractor, greater
ability to buy new capital equipment, increased ability to conduct independent research and development
programs, or ability to attract superior management personnel may be advantageous to the government
in the long run but they do not appear to be the type of benefits that a government negotiator normally
looks to when he prices a contract. From his point of view higher profits on a contract mean only
higher costs to the government immediately.
"' Ass't Secretary of Defense (I & L) and Ass't Secretary of Defense (Dept. Dir. Def. R & E) Memo-
randum, Oct. 2, 1963, set forth in Air Force Procurement Circular No. 89, No. 5, 1963, 6 Gov'T CoNrt.
REP. 80,127 (1963).
"Renegotiation figures indicate the following profit rates on different types of contracts:
Fiscal z963 Filings Renegotiable Sales Renegotiable Profits Percentage
Cost plus fixed fee $Ss,o52,ooo,ooo $348,000,000 3.15%
Fixed Price 14,389,000,000 309,000,000 2.5%
Other 5,787,000,000 259,000,000 4.47%
Total $31,228,ooo,ooo $916,ooo,ooo 2.94%
This information is included in the 1963 Renegotiation Board Report to Congress. Since this is the first
time the renegotiation statistics have been broken down in terms of types of contracts, these figures can-
not be compared to previous years to ascertain the trends in this area. It should be noted that the
"Other" category in the statistics is made up of incentive, redeterminable and time and material contracts
for the greatest part. It is also of interest that the "Fixed Price" category includes two components,
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necessary because profits in this segment of defense work are too low or whether
the policy is merely a product of some other need which the Department of Defense
was attempting to meet when the new profit policies were promulgated. However,
the impact of the new policies will undoubtedly be quite pronounced in the next
few years.
III
COMPARISON oF THE VARIOUS POLICIES IN THE PRICING AREA
What, then, is the total pricing policy of the government as enunciated by the
Department of Defense? First, obtain competition whenever possible and when
competition is used do not be concerned with the profit that is earned. Second, if
competition cannot be obtained scrutinize the costs closely to assure that they are
estimated at a reasonable level and do not contain too many contingencies or un-
allowable costs. Then add to these costs a profit that gives the contractor a fair
return for the job considering his effort, risk, and past performance. In addition,
use the profit component as an inducement to further reduce costs during perform-
ance of the work. Does this policy stand as a coherent entity or does it contain in-
ternal conflicts?
The initial question which an overall review of the policy raises is the possibility
that the competition aspect of the policy may be accomplishing the opposite result
as the policies being pursued in the area of defense procurement where cost analysis
and profit determinations are used. Increased competition is expected to result in
lower prices-as much as twenty-five per cent lower in accordance with Department
contractors who earned a profit on all of their fixed-price contracts for the year (in the aggregate) and
contractors who incurred a loss on all of their fixed-price contracts for the year (in the aggregate) as
follows:
Renegotiable Sales Renegotiable Profit, Percentage
Fixed Price (Companies
reporting a Net Profit) $bo,978,ooo,ooo $620,o0,000 S.6_s%
Fixed Price (Companies
reporting a Net Loss) 3,411,000,000 -311000,000
Total $14,389,0oo,ooo $309,000,000 2.15%
Thus, although these statistics do not represent a clean breakdown between profitable fixed-price con-
tracts and loss fixed-price contracts, they do present a dramatic picture of the impact of loss contracts
on the overall profit rates achieved in fixed-price work. In contrast, the renegotiation figures indicate
that there were almost no aggregate losses incurred in the "CPFF" or "Other" categories in these figures.
It should be noted that the only similar information previously made available by the Renegotiation
Board gave a strikingly different picture. This information was a statistical survey of the profits of the
25 companies with the largest renegotiation refunds from 1953 through 1959. This information covered
renegotiable sales of $25.7 billion and reported the following profit rates on various types of contracts:
Type of Contract Profit (as a percentage of sales)
Finn Fixed Price 18.3%
Redeterminable Fixed Price so.6%
Fixed Price Incentive 8.8%
Cost Reimbursement 4.9%
See Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense
of the House Armed Services Committee, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3x6 (xg6o).
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of Defense statements. 6 Thus, there is a real possibility that competition will reduce
profits (although the hope seems to be that it will merely eliminate the high cost
producer or the high cost production technique and hence primarily reduce costs).
This possibility is especially real as competition is extended to the marginal areas
such as those covered by the effort to establish second sources for complex equipment.
In such cases, the second source is expected to undertake the initial manufacturing
effort at a cost close to that established by the original manufacturer after sub-
stantial experience. To do this the second source may have to defer charging the
full cost of necessary engineering and tooling to the contract and may have to sub-
standally reduce his profit margins. In addition, there may well be a tendency on
the part of contractors to minimize the difficulties of the job if the need for the work
is sufficiently great. Of course, the cost to the procuring agency will be low but it may
be at the expense of profit. Is this compatible with the policies being pursued when
no competition is obtained?
Perhaps it can be argued that when competition can be obtained the working of
the system will assure that eventually reasonable profits are paid with the weak com-
panies falling by the wayside. 7 Perhaps it can be argued further that in this area
there are sufficient producers so that the loss of a few will not hurt the government but
rather will improve the system by eliminating high cost performers. However, it is
difficult to see why these arguments do not apply equally to the contractors involved
in sole source or limited source procurements where cost analysis and profit deter-
mination techniques are used. In that area, too, there appears to be an abundance of
companies eager to obtain defense contracts and the general opinion seems to be
that many of the high cost producers work in this area.3 8 Hence, there would seem
to be some basic lack of coordination in these two sides of pricing policy.
An even more striking problem can be seen when competition is injected in the
cost-profit determination area. For instance, when incentive development contracts
are initially put out to contractors for proposals, competition is the normal rule. Of
course, this competition is not price competition alone-it incorporates technical and
management considerations to a large degree. But the pricing element is present
and often induces contractors to reduce their cost estimates in an attempt to submit
a "competitive" proposal. The result may be low target costs on incentive contracts
(or difficult performance goals if performance incentives are being used) with the
result that the ultimate profit earned on the contract will be less than the target
C6 cosv RmucTioN REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 42; DOD Policy Paper, supra note 7.
a The use of competition seems to result in lower profit--based on the assumption that most price
competitive procurement results in fixed-price contracts, see note 35 supra. However, it must be realized
that these figures reflect procurements made before the recent change in policy and that they may not be
any indication of the profits being realized on the contracts that are being shifted to a competitive basis.
"It can also be argued that the comparison of figures on profit as a percentage of cost or sales is not
a good measure of profit sufficiency in the defense business. Numerous commentators have felt that
profits as a percentage of net worth was a better measure. Using this measure, defense profits are
quite high. For instance, the latest Fortune profit survey indicates that in x962 four of the top ten
companies in profit on net worth were major defense contractors (#3 Ling-Temco-Vought, 32.5%;
#5 General Dynamics, 31.0%; #7 Lockheed Aircraft, 28.4%; #9 Magnavox, 26.5%).
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profit. This is a technique for "buying in" on an incentive contract. The interesting
facet is that at the same time that competition is having this effect on targeting under
incentive contracts, the profit guidelines will increase the rate of target profit or fee
on such contracts. Hence, the contractor will be able to submit more unrealistic
targets and still come out of the contract with the profit which he feels necessary
for the work. For example, contractors may feel that a profit rate of three per cent is
perfectly acceptable on a development contract (such a rate has evidently been
acceptable for a number of years) with the important consideration being the
obtaining of the work. If the target profit or fee will be established at a rate of
nine per cent under the weighted guidelines, the contractor can utilize the six per cent
differential as a sales tool by promising targets that are difficult to attain. Of course,
the proposal must be credible or the government may reject it, but there often is a
relatively wide band of credibility in the development area.
This difficulty demonstrates an internal conflict within the new profit regulations.
If the Department of Defense establishes higher rates of profit as standards, does this
not merely give contractors a greater inducement to submit unrealistic estimates of
other elements (costs or performance targets) of a procurement in an effort to sell the
job? It would seem that this is a fair conclusion-especially when there was no
indication of an exodus from the defense industry when profit levels were at the old
rates. Hence, the new profit policies may be directly opposed to one of the major
purposes of the increased use of incentive contracts-the purpose of obtaining more
realistic original proposals.
Another question needs to be raised in regard to the function of incentive con-
tracts. This type of contract is being used as the major device for giving contractors
incentive to reduce costs. At the same time, however, other policies are aimed at the
same objective. Two such policies are the use of performance rating systems and
the inclusion of past performance as a factor in establishing the profit under the new
profit policies?'9 In addition, it should be realized that the major incentive operating
in the government contracting area is still the desire to obtain future business. The
question which arises is whether all of these other incentives do not almost com-
pletely override the operation of the profit iicentives in an incentive contract aa A
rather convincing theoretical argument can be made that they do and recent experi-
ence in the defense business would appear to indicate that many of the incentive
contracts are not being performed in a manner calculated to maximize profits. For
instance, it is clear that many contractors are spending additional money to obtain
improved performance even when such expenditures mean reduced profit on the
immediate contract being performed. Such a decision is calculated to assure that
the contractor will obtain future business-both development and manufacturing.
"' See note 8 supra.
a aA strong argument to this effect (supported by an extensive analysis of the systems procurement
process) is made in F. M. SCHERER, THE XNVEAPoNs AcQuisITioN PROCESS: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1963).
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If this is the case, the widespread use of incentive contracts with all of the associated
risks of poor targets may not be necessary to achieve the government's pricing
objectives.
Another question which should be raised is whether the policies relating to
allowable costs of government work are contrary to the profit policies. In the area
where prices are determined by cost analysis the trend seems to be in the direction
of greater disallowances of costs which must be incurred by the contractor to perform
the job. An example is the proposed limitations on bidding expenses at a time when
the solicitation of more competitive proposals by the government agencies requires
a contractor to incur more costs in this category.40 These costs disallowances reduce
profits at the same time that the new profit guidelines increase profits. If these two
policies are intended to shift some cost from the cost area to the profit areas with the
commensurate advantages of relieving the government from the need of evaluating
difficult cost areas as to allowability and of giving the contractors more management
control over these areas, the policies fit together and make sense. However, there
have been no public statements that this is the intent of the Department of Defense
and there is a suspicion that the policies were not intended to have any relationship.
If this is the case some thought should be given to the effect of cost disallowances on
profit and motivation of a contractor toward greater efficiency in the use of resources.
This discussion leads to the final broad difficulty that is apparent in the present
pricing policies. This is the underlying concept on which these policies seem to be
based that the real problems in pricing of government procurement are those prob-
lems associated with the fact that such pricing is not the same as that found in
commercial work. The end result of this type thinking is numerous small attempts
to make government contracting function more like the commercial market place.
It is suggested that this view may be a gross oversimplification of the facts. Actually,
when commercial firms are dealing with products as complex as those creating
the pricing difficulties for the government, they do not always rely on the workings
of the market place but often utilize negotiated techniques to a greater extent
than does the government in a similar situation. For instance, they do not obtain
competition in many cases but choose the most capable contractor with whom to
deal. In addition, in some cases cost reimbursement type contracts are used. This
is not to say that sole source, cost reimbursement type procurement is good procure-
ment but that in certain circumstances it can serve a needed role.41
For example, consider the procurement involving research and development
work with a cost in the range of Sxooooo to $500,000. At the present time, there is
"o There is a proposed change to the cost principles at ASPR 5-205.3, 32 C.F.R. § 15.205-3 ('933),
providing that the engineering work in bidding costs will be treated as independent research and
development costs. The effect of this change would be to make contractors bear a part of these costs
in most cases (that has been the normal treatment of independent research and development costs).
"It might be suggested that frequently the need is not to use a different (more risky) type of
contract but to bring personnel with more expertise into the buying process. Such personnel should
be able to talk about and arrive at pricing solutions to the real problems present in such procurements,
i.e., the technical problems which create the difficulties.
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a tendency to solicit unrestricted competition on a negotiated procurement for such
work, to analyze all proposals and to award the contract to the company which has
submitted the best proposal considering all factors. Such a technique is probably
the closest approximation of a market place procurement technique considering the
limited ability of either contractors or the government to arrive at a meaningful
price under such circumstances. However, considering the proposal costs incurred
by all contractors (it is not unusual to find twenty or more companies proposing to
do such a job), the effort spent by the government in evaluating the proposals and
selecting the contractor, and the cost of performance of the work, it is hard to believe
that this is not substantially more expensive to the government than if the single or
two most qualified contractors were selected for the job and all other contractors
were excluded. In this type procurement, it is generally accepted that contractors'
promised cost estimates have a sales flavor and are therefore lacking in real re-
liability. In addition, the amount of engineering talent that is wasted is enormous--
both by contractors and by the government. Yet the government appears to be
committed to the policy of obtaining more competition at any cost 4 2  In addition,
following such a competition the government now intends, in many cases, to enter
into performance incentive contracts based on target information which is subject
to all of the distortions which such a competition can impose. Such a procedure
is an invitation to contractors to play a numbers game juggling the myriad of
targets, sharing arrangements and profit factors in such a way that the government
thinks it is achieving its purposes, and yet attempting to maintain a minimum
acceptable level of profit or at least protecting itself against a loss on the contract 3
It is suggested that this type of procurement, while it has a certain theoretical
attraction, will be of no long range benefit to either the government or government
contractors. Techniques of benefit in the functioning of the market place have
their place in government procurement when the facts are similar but it is maintained
that in many cases the government would be better advised to admit that the
situation is different and not attempt to impose such techniques on procurements in
that category.
CONCLUSION
What conclusions can be drawn from this analysis? First, it is apparent that
there is no simple solution to the pricing problems faced by the Department of
42 The normal government solution is to implore contractors to reduce bidding costs; see, for example,
Jan. z2, 1962 letter from the Commander Air Force Systems Command to Air Force procurement offices
(stating in part as follows in t 3: "Proposals submitted in response to our requirements need only be
prepared simply and economically, providing a straightforward concise delineation of the proposing
contractor's capabilities to satisfactorily perform the contract being sought. Proposals, therefore, should
be practical, legible, clear and coherent. The use of elaborate formats and binders, color where black
and white would suffice, and expensive exhibits are neither required nor desired"), or to attempt to con-
trol bidding costs by threatened disallowance or partial disallowance, supra note 40. Neither solution, of
course, gets to the heart of the problem which is that the only way to reduce bidding costs sub-
stantially is for the government to accept proposals only from pre-selected qualified contractors.
" See NAsm, op. cit. supra note 14, c. 3.
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Defense or any other government agency buying complex technological products
and services. There are too many contradictory factors involved. Second, the
large-scale use of the CPFF contract allowing for pricing based on incurred
costs by itself is not a satisfactory answer to the problem. It serves the purpose
of assuring that profit rates are not excessive but it does not provide the proper
motivation for control of costs. Hence, a policy which includes other devices is
necessary. Third, the measures adopted by the Department of Defense in the past
few years, considered separately, appear to be reasonably sound measures for
achieving improvement in the overall pricing of defense contracts. The major
difficulty seems to be in the interrelationships between these measures rather than
the soundness of any one measure. In addition, the area in which some of these
techniques are being applied is subject to question. Hence, the great need at this
time is for an overall consideration of government pricing policies relating their
effect to the specific areas in which they are being applied and looking toward im-
proved internal coordination of these policies.
